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line from the cistern. No breach of the easement terms occurred
because Mr. McNally undertook such action to ensure continued use
of the shared water system, a right he enjoyed under the easement
agreement. Accordingly, Zadra was not entitled to damages for breach
of the easement agreement and thus could not mitigate by drilling a
separate well.
Still in effect, the easement agreement required forfeiture of
interest in the water system if the users "secure or obtain a working
well." The court noted Zadra's separately drilled well satisfied her use
requirements of the water system; therefore, her duty to forfeit rights
in the shared system was not excused.
Thus, the court affirmed the superior court's holding in favor of
the McNallys.
J Reid Bumgarner

O'Hagan v. Kelley, No. 262274-, 2002 Wash App. LEXIS 3192 (Wash.
Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2002) (holding that to establish an injury from
decreased water level due to an excavation project, plaintiff must
establish the excavation project caused the decreased water level and
not merely that the water level fell after they completed excavating).
The O'Hagans, the Kelleys, and the Hulberts jointly used water
from Deer Creek in Pacific County.
In 1993, Pacific County
authorized the Pacific County Drainage District ("PCDD") to excavate
a drainage ditch from Deer Creek. During the excavation project,
Brian Hulbert, the PCDD commissioner, selected the excavation site.
After PCDD completed the excavation project, the water level fell
below the O'Hagan's culvert. Consequently, the O'Hagans sued
Pacific County, PCDD, and the Hulberts for diverting water,
negligently or intentionally, from the O'Hagans' property.
Additionally, the O'Hagans sued the Kelleys for moving their diversion
point, which the O'Hagans claimed also diverted water from their
property. The Pacific County Superior Court found the Kelleys had
moved their diversion point and diverted water from the O'Hagan's
property. However, the superior court granted summary judgment to
Pacific County and PCDD on the negligence claim, finding they did
not owe the O'Hagans a special duty. The superior court also
dismissed the remaining claims against Pacific County, PCDD, and the
Hulberts, finding the O'Hagans did not establish the excavation
altered the flow of Deer Creek. The O'Hagans appealed to the
Washington Court of Appeals, challenging the superior court's grant
of summary judgment and dismissal.
The appellate court first addressed whether the superior court
correctly concluded the excavation project did not cause the water
level to fall. The superior court found the Deer Creek water level fell
below the culvert after PCDD completed the excavation project.
However, the superior court concluded that the Kelleys caused the
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water level to fall by moving their diversion point, rather than finding
the excavation project caused the lower water level. After evaluating
this issue, the court found the superior court's conclusion consistent
with the facts because the O'Hagans only established the water level
fell after the excavation, not whether the excavation caused the water
level to fall.
Next, the court determined whether the superior court correctly
concluded the public duty doctrine applied and hence Pacific County
and PCDD did not owe the O'Hagans a duty. Under the public duty
doctrine, public officials are only liable for negligence if the plaintiff
establishes an official breached a specific duty owed to them, rather
than the public generally. However, there are three exceptions to this
doctrine: (1) if the plaintiff establishes a special relationship; (2) if the
public official fails to enforce a statute; or (3) if the government acts in
a proprietary function. First, the court found the O'Hagans failed to
establish a special relationship because they did not prove they relied
on Pacific County's or PCDD's assurances. Secondly, although the
O'Hagans asserted a violation of a takings and nuisance statute, the
O'Hagans failed to establish the failure to enforce exception because
they did not establish the legislature specifically charged Pacific
County or PCDD with enforcing these statutes. Finally, the court
concluded the O'Hagans failed to establish the excavation project was
too small to benefit the public as a whole and hence, the proprietary
function exception did not apply.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the superior court's finding
because the O'Hagans did not establish the excavation project caused
the lower water level and because the O'Hagans failed to establish an
exception to the public duty doctrine.
Heather Chamberlain

Uselmann v. Clark County, No. 27949-5-11, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS
2930 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2002) (holding that so long as a fee is
for the purpose of regulating storm water quality, is directly related to
that regulation, and is allocated only to the regulation of storm water
quality, the fee is regulatory in nature and not an unlawful tax).
Edwin Uselmann and Tom Miekle ("landowners") filed a
complaint in the Superior Court of Clark County against Clark County
("County") challenging the validity of a County ordinance that
assessed a fee on property with improvements valued over $10,000
located in the unincorporated areas of the County. The County used
the fee to regulate storm water quality, in compliance with its
obligations under the federal Clean Water Act. The landowners
sought a declaratory judgment that the fee was an unconstitutional tax.
The trial court granted the County's cross-motion for summary
judgment. The landowners appealed to the Washington Court of
Appeals for Division Two.

